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| 文章编号：1672-3104(2006)03-0274-05 |
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中国车险风险与代理佣金支付规则研究 |
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林赟 |
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（中共中央党校经济学部,北京100091） |
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| 摘 要： 近几年,车险事故率、骗赔案件不断攀升,许多保险公司试图通过拒保、大幅提升费率来化解风险。本文通过对费率、理赔、监管和激励等方面的分析,指出大幅提高车险费率并不可行,而减少车险赔付不可取。消费者买保险,多是冲着理赔而去,该赔不赔或惜赔,都会导致保户流失。保险市场的信息不对称,容易引发道德风险,即便完善诚信制度,也很难避免该类问题发生。作者建议,应运用激励手段,改变保险代理佣金的支付规则,从源头上杜绝超额承保和超额赔付。 |
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| 关键词： 车险;信息不对称;代理人;代理佣金 |
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The risk of motor vehicle and the principle of the study of the proxy commission in China |
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LIN Yun |
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（Economics Department, Party School of the CPC Central Committee, Beijing100091, China） |
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| Abstract: In recent years, the accident rate and the payment swindling of the motor vehicle insurance climb unceasingly. As a result, many insurance companies attempt through the underwriting rejection and increasing the premium tariff largely to mitigate the risk. The writer analyzes the premium tariff, compensation, supervising and incentive, and points out that it is not feasible to increase the premium tariff largely or decrease the compensation. The consumers buy the insurance products in order to get compensation when they meet with incidents. If the insurance company will not pay or pay enough, the consumers will not abandon it next time. In insurance market, the asymmetrical information initiates the moral risk easily. It is very difficult to avoid this kind of question, even if after perfect faith system is established. The author suggests that the incentive measures should be taken and the commission principle of proxy should be converted so that the excess underwriting and over-paid will be avoided. |
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Key words: motor vehicle insurance; asymmetrical information; proxy; commission |
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