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中南大学学报(社会科学版)
ZHONGNAN DAXUE XUEBAO(SHEHUI KEXUE BAN)

2016年06月第22卷第3期
   
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文章编号:1672-3104(2016)03-0091-07
 
公平视角下创新网络中企业稳定合作的博弈分析与行为验证
 
曹兴1, 2,高远1
 
(1. 中南大学商学院,湖南长沙,410083;2. 湖南工业大学商学院,湖南株洲,412007)
 
摘  要: 从公平角度分析了创新网络中的合作脆弱性问题,构建了企业合作公平博弈模型,通过引入惩罚机制和领导机制,研究机制对稳定合作的促进作用。在此基础上,应用z-Tree软件,通过行为实验对构建的博弈理论模型进行了验证。研究结果表明:互动公平的心理,使在传统博弈论中不可能达到的帕累托最优均衡成为可能;即使网络成员具有合作的特质,如果没有相应的机制激励,合作难免出现退化趋势;惩罚机制对维护合作稳定性方面作用显著,领导机制所发挥的榜样作用具有一定的局限性。
 
关键词: 创新网络;合作稳定性;公平博弈;行为实验
 
 
Game analysis and behavior verification on stable cooperation among corporations in the innovation network: From the perspective of fairness
 
CAO Xing1, 2, GAO Yuan1
 
(1. School of Business, Central South University, Changsha 410083, China;
2. School of Business, Hunan University of Technology, Zhuzhou 412007, China)
 
Abstract: By taking the perspective of fairness to analyze the nature of problems in cooperation process of corporations in the innovation network, the present essay constructs a game model for cooperation among corporations, and, by introducing penalty mechanism and leadership mechanism, investigates the effect of these mechanisms on stablizing the cooperation. On this basis, the essay employs z-Tree software to verify the conclusion of the theoretical model. Research findings show that the preference of fairness makes the Pareto Optimality possible, that without any corresponding incentive of mechanism, the partnership becomes vulnerable even if the members are cooperative by nature, that the penalty mechanism can effectively maintain the stability of enterprise cooperation, and that there exists certain limitation in the sheer force of example that leadership mechanism plays.
 
Key words: innovation system; cooperation stability; fair game; behavioral experiment
 
 
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