|
| 文章编号：1672-3104(2016)06-0023-07 |
| |
|
盖梯尔问题、认知运气与可能世界——诺齐克敏感性理论对怀疑主义的回应 |
| |
丁晓军 |
| |
|
（西安交通大学人文社会科学学院，陕西西安，710049） |
| |
| 摘 要： 在对知识成立条件的探索中，运气对知识的摧毁作用逐渐受到人们的关注。为了排除这种与知识不相容的认知运气，诺齐克从可能世界理论出发提出敏感性理论，主张只有当认知主体的信念状态能够对命题的真值进行追踪的时候其真信念才能算作知识。敏感性理论成功解决了诸多盖梯尔反例，深化了人们对知识的理解与把握。面对怀疑主义的挑战，敏感性理论一方面承认自己无法证明怀疑主义者的假说是假的，另一方面则在此基础上继续说明人类的日常知识何以可能。然而在对怀疑主义的处理过程中，敏感性理论由于拒斥了知识封闭原则从而受到诸多责难，而敏感性是否是真信念成为知识的充分必要条件也受到克里普克等哲学家的质疑。 |
| |
| 关键词： 敏感性理论；盖梯尔问题；认知运气；可能世界；怀疑主义；知识封闭原则 |
| |
|
| |
Gettier problem, epistemic luck and possible worlds: Response of Nozickian sensitivity theory to skepticism |
| |
DING Xiaojun |
| |
（School of Humanities and Social Science, Xi’an Jiaotong University, Xi’an 710049, China） |
| |
| Abstract: In the exploration of the conditions for knowledge, people gradually recognize the role of knowledge-destroying luck. In order to preclude the epistemic luck which is incompatible with knowledge, Robert Nozick puts forward the sensitivity theory from the perspective of possible worlds, advocating that a true belief could be seen as knowledge if and only if the cognitive agent’s belief statuses towards proposition p could track the truth value of p. The sensitivity theory manages to deal with many Gettier-like counterexamples, greatly deepening and enhancing our understanding and comprehension of the thesis of knowledge. Confronted with the challenges from skepticism, the sensitivity theory on the one hand acknowledges that it can’t falsify the hypotheses of skepticism; on the other hand it continues to explain why we could still retain almost all of our ordinary knowledge. However, in its treatment of skepticism, the sensitivity theory controversially refutes the epistemic closure principle, which used to be regarded as an evidently right principle. What’s more, according to philosophers such as Saul Kripke, it still remains a problem whether the conditions of the sensitivity theory are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for a true belief to constitute knowledge. |
| |
Key words: the sensitivity theory; epistemic luck; Gettier problem; possible worlds; skepticism; epistemic closure principle |
| |
|
