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中南大学学报(社会科学版)
ZHONGNAN DAXUE XUEBAO(SHEHUI KEXUE BAN)

2016年08月第22卷第4期
   
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文章编号:1672-3104(2016)04-0001-06
 
麦凯对善的两种含义考察
 
赵瑾
 
(华东师范大学人文社会科学学院,上海,200241)
 
摘  要: 回应摩尔的善的不可定义说,麦凯在一般意义上和伦理意义上分别考察了善的含义。麦凯首先赞同摩尔将成为善的性质和善本身区别开来,但是反对摩尔将善在道德语境下的不可定义性视作一个重要命题。其原因在于对善进行不可定义操作对实际的道德问题的解决并没有帮助,并且如果仅考察善的一般含义认为其不可定义,无法说明在道德语境下善的不可定义。因此麦凯得出,在对善的一般意义描述中,善的含义留下了一种假定的对好的内在需求,而对善的伦理含义分析中则留下了善是以自我为中心对事物进行称赞的可能性。
 
关键词: 麦凯;善;一般意义;伦理意义
 
 
Mackie’s investigation into the two implications of good
 
ZHAO Jin
 
(School of Humanities and Social Sciences, East China Normal University, Shanghai 200241, China)
 
Abstract: In response to Moore’s belief that good cannot be defined, Mackie investigates the implications of good both at the general level and the moral level. Mackie firstly approves that Moore distinguishes the nature of good and good itself, but Mackie is against Moore’s claim in that good can not be defined in the context of morality, especially as an important proposition. Mackie’s reason is that it does not help us resolve the problem in the actual moral circumstance to define good which actually cannot be defined, and that if we think that good cannot be defined only by investigating the general level of good,it will be unable to explain why it is the same in the context of moral circumstance. Therefore, Mackie concludes that in a general description of good, the meaning of good has left a presumptive internal demand, while in the analysis of the moral meaning of good, the meaning of good has left the possibility of evaluating good from a self-centered praise.
 
Key words: Mackie; good; the general meaning; the moral implication
 
 
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