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| 文章编号：1672-3104(2009)01−0018−04 |
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集体行动的困境：理论阐释和实证分析 |
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潘泽泉，李雪 |
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（中南大学社会学系，湖南长沙，410083） |
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| 摘 要： 依据奥尔森的“搭便车”理论和集体行动困境的理论模型对Q市一居民小区的水费缴纳行为调查研究表明：集体行动的形成取决于成员之间存在共同利益，并依赖于组织中公认权威的号召与带领；集体行动困境的最终解决需要领导权威将成员的共同利益转化为一致的利益偏好和行动取向，从而消除成员的“搭便车”心理，采取一致行动。 |
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| 关键词： 集体行动； 公共物品；“搭便车”；集体博弈 |
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The dilemma of collective action: a theoretical illustration and
empirical analysis |
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PAN Zequan, LI Xue |
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（Department of Sociology, Center South University, Changsha 410083, China） |
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| Abstract: The investigation of the water charge in Q-city in Residential Region shows that the forming of collective action depended on the common benefits between the remembers. The forming of collective action relies on the public authority’s call and leading, and further eliminated the members free-rider psychology. The final solution of the collective action dilemma needs the leading authority makes the common interests into consistent interests prejudice and action orientation, then takes the same action. |
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Key words: collective action; public goods; free-rider; a game action of collective |
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