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| 文章编号：1672-3104(2013)05-0059-05 |
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休谟哲学“自然主义解读”中的 “越界使用”问题及其后果 |
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刘金山 |
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（东北师范大学哲学院，吉林长春，130024） |
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| 摘 要： 诺曼·肯普·斯密斯的工作使“自然主义”成为对休谟哲学的主流解读之一，这种解读要求理性不能对情感进行“越界使用”。但是，通过澄清休谟的理性概念，我们发现，根据休谟的理论系统，“越界使用”是无法避免的。“越界使用”的出现使休谟的自然主义解读最终归于失败，自然主义解读失败的后果是休谟的经验推理没有获得恰当的形而上学解释。 |
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| 关键词： 自然主义；休谟；理性；情感；越界使用 |
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The problem of “overstepping usage” in the naturalism reading of David Hume and it’s consequence |
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LIU Jinshan |
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（Philosophy Department, Northeast Normal University, Changchun 130024, China） |
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| Abstract: Naturalism has been one of the main explanations to David Hume’s philosophy in Kemp Smith’s prominent work. That reason should not overstep to passion is one condition of this kind of explanation. Yet, as far as Hume’s concept of reason being clarified, we find that reason being used oversteppedly to passions is unavoidable in Hume’s theory system. This kind of “Overstepping Usage” makes Hume’s naturalism fail ultimately. The consequence of this kind of failure is that Hume’s reason about the matter of fact does not get a proper ontological explain and that the general argument of Hume’s philosophy is insufficiency. |
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Key words: naturalism; Hume; reason; passions; overstepping usage |
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