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中南大学学报(社会科学版)
ZHONGNAN DAXUE XUEBAO(SHEHUI KEXUE BAN)

2005年10月第11卷第5期
   
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文章编号:1672-3104(2005)05-0632-04
 
供应链管理中的“牛鞭效应”及最优委托权安排
 
何红渠,谭丽
 
(中南大学商学院,湖南长沙,410083)
 
摘  要: “牛鞭效应”是供应链管理中的常见现象,它的存在降低了供应链的整体效率,日益成为了人们关注的热点。本文首先介绍了什么是“牛鞭效应”并分析了其成因,然后针对如何缓解“牛鞭效应”,从委托代理的角度分析了一般企业和供应链虚拟企业之间的共同点,并考虑一个简单的由制造商和零售商组成的供应链,将张维迎用于一般企业的最优委托权安排模型应用于供应链企业,得出在无信息共享和共享顾客订货信息的情况下,应将委托权分
配给制造商;在完全信息共享情况下,则应将零售商作为委托人,从而实现对供应链成员企业的最优委托权安排,达到减缓“牛鞭效应”的目的。
 
关键词: 供应链;牛鞭效应;委托代理;委托权
 
 
The bullwhip effect and assignment of principalship in supply chain management
 
HE Hong-qu,TAN Li
 
(School of Business,Central South University,ChangSha 410083,China)
 
Abstract: The bullwhip effect, a common phenomenon in supply chain, has sharply cut the whole efficiency of supply chain and become a hot issue. In this paper, we firstly explained the“Bullwhip Effect”and its causes. To relieve the“Bullwhip Effect”, we analyzed the similarity between common enterprise and virtual enterprise in supply chain and set up a simple supply chain that consists of manufacturer and tradesman. Then we tried to apply the model, which was used by Weiying Zhang in the common enterprise, to the supply chain. we deduced that principalship should be assigned to the manufacturer when there is no share of information or only the share of client s ordering information; however, the principalship should be assigned to the tradesman when there is a complete share of information. By doing so, we optimized the assignment of principalship in the supply chain enterprises and also successfully relieved the“Bullwhip Effect”.
 
Key words: supply chain; bullwhip effect; principal-agent; principalship
 
 
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