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| 文章编号：1672-3104(2022)05-0065-13 |
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环保考核、晋升激励与企业环境违规 |
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任胜钢，刘东华，肖晓婷 |
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（中南大学商学院，湖南长沙，410083） |
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| 摘 要： 为了探讨中央政府将环境保护纳入领导干部政绩考核评价体系这一机制改革，以2008年至2018年重污染行业中国上市企业为研究对象，考察环保考核如何影响当地企业的环境违规行为。研究结果表明：第一，在环保考核评价体系下，在环境污染较为严重的地区，非临近退休的省长相较于临近退休的省长推动当地企业减少环境违规行为的效果更为显著。第二，对企业环境违规的抑制效果在CEO任期较短的公司和高管拥有政治联系的公司中效果更为显著。文章揭示了领导干部如何基于政治激励实现环保考核目标，拓展了环保考核的作用机制研究，为环保考核制度的实践效果提供了企业层面的研究证据，为在实践中进一步推进官员考核体系改革和完善地区环境治理提供了政策启示。 |
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| 关键词： 环保考核；政治激励；环境违规；政治联系 |
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Environmental assessment, political incentives and corporate environmental violations |
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REN Shenggang, LIU Donghua, XIAO Xiaoting |
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（School of Business, Central South University, Changsha 410083, China） |
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| Abstract: In order to explore the institutional reform of the Central Government in including environmental protection into the cadre political performance assessment system, this study, with Chinese listed firms in heavily polluting industries from 2008 to 2018 as the study object, examines how environmental assessment affects the environmental violations of local firms. The empirical results show that, firstly, in the environmental assessment system, in provinces with more serious environmental pollution, the effect that non-retiring governors exert on promoting local firms to reduce environmental violations is more significant than retiring governors, and secondly, the inhibition effect of the enterprise’s environmental violation is more pronounced in firms with early-tenure CEOs and firms with political connections. This study sheds light on how government officials achieve environmental assessment goals based on political incentives, and extends research on the influence mechanism of environmental assessment, which provides firm-level evidence for the effectiveness of the cadre assessment system that incorporates environmental protection. This study also provides policy implications for further promoting the reform of the cadre assessment system and improving the regional environmental governance. |
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Key words: environmental assessment; political incentives; environmental violations; political connections |
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