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中南大学学报(社会科学版)
ZHONGNAN DAXUE XUEBAO(SHEHUI KEXUE BAN)

2021年11月第27卷第6期
   
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文章编号:1672-3104(2021)06-0054-07
 
康德论“道德狂热”
 
费尚军
 
(南昌大学人文学院,江西南昌,330031)
 
摘  要: 康德在《实践理性批判》中认为,道德狂热表现为逾越人类纯粹实践理性所确立的界限,妄想作为有限存在者的主体完全摆脱感性欲望和冲动,从而达到一个神圣性的道德理想。而作为不完美和有限的生灵,人类所能达到的道德等级层次就是对道德法则的敬重。康德对道德狂热的斥责,在反对人类作为有限的理性存在者的过度自负和自大的同时,并没有贬损人类对道德价值和崇高精神的追求。在他看来,义务和敬重感既使人类找到了唯一能够给自己奠定价值的不可或缺的条件,也让我们找到了人类本性中彰显高贵的根源,以及其可能的获得方式。
 
关键词: 康德;《实践理性批判》;道德狂热;义务;道德理想
 
 
Kant on moral fanaticism
 
FEI Shangjun
 
(School of Humanities, Nanchang University, Nanchang 330031, China)
 
Abstract: In The Critique of Practical Reason, Kant believes that moral fanaticism is represented by overstepping the bounds which practical pure reason sets for humanity, and falling into delusion that the finite rational beings can completely get rid of the sensual desires and impulses, and then achieve a moral ideal of divinity. But the moral level on which the human beings stand as the imperfect and finite creatures means respect for the moral law. Kant’s condemnation of moral fanaticism, though opposing the excessive conceit and arrogance of human beings as the finite rational existence, does not derogate their pursuit of moral values and noble spirit. In his view, duty and sense of respect have enabled human beings to find not only the only indispensable condition that can lay their own value, but also the roots of the nobleness of human nature and its possible means of access.
 
Key words: Kant; The Critique of Practical Reason; moral fanaticism; duty; moral ideal
 
 
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