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中南大学学报(社会科学版)
ZHONGNAN DAXUE XUEBAO(SHEHUI KEXUE BAN)

2019年03月第25卷第2期
   
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文章编号:1672-3104(2019)02-0089-09
 
城市房屋征收补偿中极端争议的博弈研究:基于偏好集合均衡视角
 
洪开荣,苏尹馨
 
(中南大学商学院,湖南长沙,410083)
 
摘  要: 从偏好集合均衡角度解释城市房屋征收补偿中的极端争议问题,构建极端争议的行为博弈模型,将博弈均衡结果归纳为“政府寻租型”和“钉子户困局型”两种极端争议,最后结合现实征收案例,得到不同极端争议情景中,主体行为偏好对关联主体互动行为的作用机理。研究结果表明,“政府寻租型”极端争议是由地方政府弱互动公平偏好主导,并由被征收居民弱互动公平偏好和征收信息不对称共同促成;“钉子户困局型”极端争议是由被征收居民损失规避偏好主导,征收补偿分配结果由地方政府的损失规避偏好和信念判断决定。极端争议是主体差异性行为偏好的集合作用的收益极端化结果。应制定符合关联主体利益偏好的补偿方案,建立包容征收补偿主体多维偏好的征收政策。
 
关键词: 极端争议;偏好集合均衡;互动公平偏好;损失规避偏好;征收补偿
 
 
Game research on extreme controversy in urban house expropriation compensation: Based on preference set equilibrium perspective
 
HONG Kairong, SU Yinxin
 
(School of Business, Central South University, Changsha 410083, China)
 
Abstract: From the perspective of set preference equilibrium, the present study explains the extreme controversy in the urban house expropriation compensation, constructs a dynamic game model of the behavior of the extreme controversy, generalizes the game equilibrium result into such two extreme controversies as "government rent-seeking" type and "nail house dilemma" type, and finally combines with the case analysis formation mechanism of extreme controversy to arrive at the interaction mechanism of action of extreme controversy behavior preference of related subject in different extreme controversies. Research findings show that the extreme controversy of "government rent-seeking" is dominated by the local government's preference for weak interactive justice, which is jointly contributed by the residents' preference for weak interactive justice and the information asymmetry of expropriation. The extreme controversy of "nail household dilemma" is dominated by the loss aversion preference of the residents who are expropriated, and the result of expropriation compensation distribution is determined by the local government's loss aversion preference and belief judgment. The extreme controversy is the result of the income extreme of the collective action of the subject's different behavior preference. Therefore, it is necessary to formulate a compensation scheme in line with the interest preference of related subjects and establish a collection policy that embraces the multi-dimensional preference of the expropriation compensation subject.
 
Key words: extreme controversy; set preferences equilibrium; reciprocal fairness preference; loss aversion preference;expropriation compensation
 
 
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