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中南大学学报(社会科学版)
ZHONGNAN DAXUE XUEBAO(SHEHUI KEXUE BAN)

2018年09月第24卷第5期
   
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文章编号:1672-3104(2018)05-0026-07
 
康德统觉理论中的主体知识问题
 
唐红光
 
(长沙学院马克思主义学院,湖南长沙,410003)
 
摘  要: 在对待主体知识问题上,康德试图通过批判理性心理学的主体学说来表明扩展主体知识的企图是徒劳的。理性心理学构建主体知识的合理性依据是统觉概念。通过统觉概念不能推导出任何主体的先天知识,并且正是对统觉的误解才形成了关于主体知识的幻象,消除这种误解在某种意义上就等同于限制了主体知识的扩展。先验统觉的功能性特征决定了它作为先验自我意识只指示主体实存,不表象主体,不能构建主体知识。主体表面上似乎拥有关于“我”的知识,实质上只是一些关于客体的自我知识。在先验观念下,康德借助统觉概念达到了区分先验主体与经验自我的目的,在理论层面真正解决了主体知识问题。
 
关键词: 康德;理性心理学;统觉理论;主体知识
 
 
The problem of the Subject’s knowledge in Kant’s theory of apperception
 
TANG Hongguang
 
(School of Marxism, Changsha University, Changsha 410022, China)
 
Abstract: In dealing with the problem of the Subject’s knowledge, Kant, by criticizing rational psychology of the Subject’s knowledge, tries to indicate the futility of attempting to expand the Subject’s knowledge. Concept of apperception is the rationalization basis for rational psychology to construct the Subject’s knowledge. We cannot induce any subject’s innate knowledge through apperception; misreading apperception leads to illusion about the Subject’s knowledge, and eliminating this misreading is restricting the extending of the Subject’s knowledge in some sense. The functional feature of transcendental apperception determines that it denotes the existence of the Subject as transcendental self-consciousness, rather than representing the Subject or constructing the Subject’s knowledge. Seemingly, it includes the knowledge about “me”, but essentially, it is only self-knowledge about the Object. Under the transcendental idealism, Kant, by achieving the aim of differentiating transcendental Subject from experiencing self by means of apperception, solves in theory the problem of the Subject’s knowledge.
 
Key words: Kant; rational psychology; theory of apperception; the Subject’s knowledge
 
 
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