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| 文章编号：1672-3104(2017)06-0001-06 |
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回避怀疑论的另一种方式——托马斯·内格尔的理性主义认识论 |
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贾可春 |
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（南京工业大学马克思主义学院，江苏南京，211800） |
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| 摘 要： 从实在论的本体论出发，内格尔认为认识论上的怀疑论是不可避免的，但可以用自我超越的概念来取代它。内格尔指出，认识的客观的进步的可能性源自主体内部的先天成分，而认识论的希望则在于逐步确立一种能与个体视角共存并能理解它的超然的视角。与康德在承认知识的客观性的基础上探讨认识的可能性的做法不同，内格尔主要是在承知识进步的基础上探讨这种进步是如何可能的。通过强调人的先天理性在认识中的作用，内格尔不仅有效回避了怀疑论，而且合理解释了部分科学知识的产生。 |
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| 关键词： 内格尔；认识论；怀疑论；客观；自我超越 |
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Another way of avoiding scepticism |
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JIA Kechun |
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（College of Marxism, Nanjing Tech University, Nanjing 211800, China） |
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| Abstract: From the ontological view of realism, Nagle thinks that the epistemological scepticism is unavoidable, but we can substitute a self-transcendent conception for it. He points out that the possibility of objective progress about the matter of cognition is derived from an a priori element within the subject, and the epistemological hope lies in the development of a detached perspective which can coexist with and comprehend the individual one. Different from Kant who explores the possibility of cognition on the basis of acknowledging the objectivity of knowledge, Nagel mainly discusses the possibility of the progress of knowledge on the basis of acknowledging such progress. By stressing the role of man’s innate reason, Nagel not only avoids scepticism effectively, but also explains reasonably how some scientific knowledge comes into being. |
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Key words: Nagel; epistemology; skepticism; objective; self-transcendence |
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