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| 文章编号：1672-3104(2017)04-0077-08 |
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从认识论到实践论：皮浪主义挑战下的休谟问题 |
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栾俊 |
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（复旦大学哲学学院，上海，200433） |
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| 摘 要： 回到休谟哲学的原初语境，休谟问题(因果/归纳问题)并非仅是认识论问题。休谟提出这一问题的本意也不仅只为引起后人继续对之进行认识论回应。休谟把认识论哲学定性为彻底的怀疑主义恰恰意味着：在皮浪主义挑战下，我们必须摆脱单纯的认识论立场来重新理解这一问题。休谟通过他的自然主义表明，该问题的实质乃是后怀疑主义实践论意义上的，即当在理论上皮浪主义不可避免时，我们在实践上应用因果/归纳推理何以可能。休谟提出自然因果观的同时并未排斥哲学的因果观，后者虽不能为因果/归纳推理奠基，但它却可对我们实际的推理活动做出有效规范。由此，休谟把理论奠基于实践，并使这两者都在世俗启蒙的意义上获得了新的自我理解。 |
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| 关键词： 休谟问题；认识论；自然主义；后怀疑主义；实践与理论 |
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From epistemology to practical theory: Hume’s problem under the challenge of Pyrrhonism |
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LUAN Jun |
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（School of Philosophy, Fudan University, Shanghai 200433, China） |
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| Abstract: Back to the original context of Hume's philosophy, Hume’s problem (cause and effect/induction problem) is not only a matter of Epistemology. Hume’s original intention of putting forward this problem is not merely to invite us to continue the epistemic responses to it. Hume qualified the epistemological philosophy as radical skepticism, which just means that under the challenge of Pyrrhonism, we must get rid of the pure epistemological position and then rethink over this problem. Hume, through his naturalism, showed that the essence of the problem is in the sense of post-skeptical practice, that is, how we can apply causal or inductive inferences in practice when the Pyrrhonism can’t be avoided in theory. Beside the natural relation of causation, Hume did not reject the philosophical relation of causality; although the latter can’t lay the foundation of causal/ inductive reasoning, it can make effective norms for our reasoning activities. Thus, Hume based theory on practice, and made both of them obtain new self-understandings in the sense of secular enlightenment. |
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Key words: Hume’s problem; epistemology; naturalism; post-skepticism; practice and theory |
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