|
| 文章编号：1672-3104(2017)03-0027-07 |
| |
|
走向“政治性公司法”——党组织如何参与公司治理 |
| |
蒋大兴 |
| |
|
（北京大学法学院，北京，100871） |
| |
| 摘 要： “政治性公司法”是“重视国企”或“重视党组织参与公司治理”的公司法模式的别称，该种公司法模式与Hansmann等谈及的“国家主义导向”的公司治理模式有某种家族相似性。“政治性公司法”之提出，意味着处于西方公司法包围过程中的中国开始思考公司治理的民族特色／政治特色。中国的社会主义本质，以及国企“公共财产”的本质，决定了中国国企应更多地凸显其公共性／人民性的一面。“重视国企”／“重视党组织参与公司治理”，本身存在宪法和公司法上的依据，也是中国应对TPP等西方式“国企压制”，彰显“经济发展道路自信”的重要方式。当然，党组织参与公司治理，仍应平衡好企业治理效率与治理安全的关系，公司治理之本质在于凸显“效率经营”。尤其在国企决策效率本身仍有待进一步提高的背景下，党组织参与公司治理的设计，不应成为企业“效率化经营”的障碍，更不应因此无谓地增加公司的运营成本。 |
| |
| 关键词： 政治性公司法；党组织；国企；公司治理 |
| |
|
| |
Political company law: How party organization participates in corporate governance |
| |
JIANG Daxing |
| |
（School of Law, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China） |
| |
| Abstract: “Political company law” is a nickname of company laws “attaching importance to state-owned enterprises” (or “attaching importance to party organization to participate in corporate governance”), which share certain family resemblances with “statism-oriented” corporate governance models. The proposal of "political company law" means that China, a country influenced by western company laws, has begun to reflect on national and political characteristics of corporate governance. Since China is a socialist country and state-owned enterprises are “public properties”, Chinese state-owned enterprises are supposed to particularly highlight their public and people-oriented natures. In essence, some evidences may also be found from constitutions and company laws that “importance shall be attached to state-owned enterprises” (or importance shall be attached to party organization to participate in corporate governance), which is important for China to respond to limits of TPP upon state-owned enterprises and highlight “confidence about paths of economic development”. To be sure, it is still necessary to achieve a balance between efficiency and safety of corporate governance when the Communist Party of China gets involved in the governance. The essence of corporate governance is highlighting “efficient operations”. It is more improper to hinder enterprises’ “efficient operations” because of the party’s involvement in corporate governance since the decision-making efficiency of state-owned enterprises remains to be further improved, or needlessly increase companies’ operating costs. |
| |
|
| |
|
|
