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中南大学学报(社会科学版)
ZHONGNAN DAXUE XUEBAO(SHEHUI KEXUE BAN)

2017年01月第23卷第1期
   
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文章编号:1672-3104(2017)01-0012-06
 
对休谟的“道德情感”的两个基础性批判
 
刘少明
 
(武汉大学哲学学院,湖北武汉,430072)
 
摘  要: 基于休谟的道德情感的情境性及道德情感对指涉对象的依赖性特征,来研判其道德情感论可知:道德情感本身的原发性是可疑的,其本身并不一定就是道德行为和判断的始发点;道德情感的指涉对象是需要提前被规定的,否则道德情感是十分盲目的。前者对情感作为道德基础的动力特点发出了挑战:要证明情感的原发性,需要排除的环境和背景因素太复杂,要实现理想化的操作几乎不可能。而证明情感的情境性却十分容易。后一个批判对道德情感的清晰性产生了怀疑,而休谟的解决方式是设定道德原则和理想化的人。这样的设定又不符合经验论的认识方法,基础十分薄弱。因此,这两个道德情感的隐含特点,构成了对休谟将情感作为道德的基础的理论极大的挑战。
 
关键词: 情感;道德;情景;指涉
 
 
Two fundamental criticisms at Hume’s “moral sentiment”
 
LIU Shaoming
 
(School of Philosophy, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China)
 
Abstract: Based on the two features of Hume’s moral sentiment, namely the emotional context and the dependence of moral sentiment on their referents, we can clarify that the primary of moral emotion is questionable in his theory of moral sentiment, which in itself is not necessarily ethical behavior and starting point of moral judgment. The moral emotion of referent objects are to be specified in advance, otherwise the moral emotions are very blind. The former one has challenged the moral emotion as the basis of moral force. It is almost impossible to testify the primary and to realize the idealized operation as the environment and background factors are too complicated. But it is fairly easy to find the proof that moral sentiments have some backgrounds. The second critic view casts doubt on the clarity of moral feeling. Hume’s solution to this problem is to set ethical principles and idealistic people. This presumption does not comply with the method of empiricism, which proves that the foundation of this solution is very weak. So these two implicit characteristics of moral emotions have a great challenge at Hume’s theory which regards the sentiment as the basis of morality.
 
Key words: sentiment; morality; circumstance; reference
 
 
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