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| 文章编号：1672-3104(2016)03-0015-07 |
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论黑格尔对康德哲学主观性的批评 |
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武潇洁 |
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（复旦大学哲学学院，上海，200433） |
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| 摘 要： 黑格尔批评康德先验哲学是主观观念论，并不是否认知性范畴的客观有效性，因为康德已经改变了客观性的含义。黑格尔所反对的是：仅仅从思维是主观的还是客观的这个角度来讨论思维。康德为了说明思维的客观性，使存在仅仅成为对知识有意义的东西，讨论沦为对象的存在只是在讨论主观性，存在的绝对统一性丧失了。黑格尔要解决的不仅是思维与存在在认识论上的统一，还要解决二者在本体论上的统一。他一方面接受康德的观点，承认存在的概念特征，另一方面把康德的知性范畴转化成客观理性的概念。存在被视为一个将自身概念化的整全之一，概念也在对存在的规定中将自身展开为一个绝对的整体。在这个概念的总体中，主客之分就被超越了，存在的规定就是理性自身的规定。 |
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| 关键词： 黑格尔；康德；先验哲学；存在；主观性；客观性；概念；理性；整体 |
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Hegel’s critique at the subjectivity of Kant’s philosophy |
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WU Xiaojie |
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（Department of Philosophy, Fudan University, Shanghai 200433, China） |
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| Abstract: Hegel regards Kant’s transcendental philosophy as subjective idealism, which does not mean that Hegel is denying the objective validity of Kant’s cognitive category because Kant has changed the connotation of objectivity. What Hegel is opposed to is that thinking is examined in the subjective way or objective way. To illustrate the objectivity of thinking, Kant makes “being” merely meaningful to “knowing” so that discussion of “being” as object equals that of subjectivity, and that the absolute unity of “being” is lost. What Hegel attempts to solve is the unity of thinking and “being” in the epistemological sense, but also in the ontological sense. He shares with Kant that “being” is of conceptual character, but transforms Kant’s category into concepts of objective reason. “Being” is taken as a self-conceptualizing whole, and concept develops itself into an absolute whole in its determination of “being”. In this conceptual totality, the distinction of subject and object is superseded, and the determination of “being” is the very determination of reason itself. |
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Key words: Hegel; Kant; transcendental philosophy; “being”; subjectivity; objectivity; concept; reason; whole |
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