自然科学版 英文版
自然科学版 英文版
自然科学版 英文版
 

中南大学学报(社会科学版)
ZHONGNAN DAXUE XUEBAO(SHEHUI KEXUE BAN)

2014年06月第20卷第3期
   
本文已被:浏览2010次    下载870次   
文章编号:1672-3104(2014)03-0044-06
 
康德《实践理性批判》对自由实在性的演绎
 
李扬
 
(武汉大学哲学学院,湖北武汉,430072)
 
摘  要: 在《实践理性批判》中,康德把道德律看成是一个“理性的事实”,它不需要任何演绎和论证,自身就具有客观必然的有效性。这个“理性的事实”可以充当对自由能力进行演绎的起点,从它出发首先经由对纯粹实践法则与自由的交互关系的论证,可以推导出自由的实在性;继而通过知性世界与感性世界的二重设定,可以解决自由和必然性的冲突,使自由有了通向现实世界的孔道。由此不仅扩展了凭借思辨理性不可能获得的知识,而且沟通了两大批判,实现了理论理性和实践理性的统一。
 
关键词: 康德;《实践理性批判》;理性的事实;自由;道德律;交互关系;感性世界;知性世界
 
 
An enquiry concerning the deduction of the reality of freedom in Critique of Practical Reason of Kant
 
LI Yang
 
(School of Philosophy, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China)
 
Abstract: In Critique of practical reason, Kant takes the moral law as a fact of pure reason which is apodictically certain. Therefore, the objectivity of it cannot be proved by any kind of deduction, conversely, the moral law itself servers as the principle of the deduction of freedom. Because freedom and the moral law reciprocally imply each other, from which the reality of freedom can be deduced. And with the distinction between world of sense and world of understanding, the confliction of freedom to necessity is avoided. Through this deduction, in its practical use pure reason obtains the right to extension which is not possible to it in its speculative use.
 
Key words: Kant; Critique of Practical Reason; a fact of reason; freedom; moral low; reciprocal relation; world of sense; world of understanding
 
 
版权所有:《中南大学学报(社会科学版)》编辑部 
地 址:湖南省长沙市岳麓区麓山南路932号     邮编: 410083
电 话: 0731-88830141
电子邮箱: znsk@csu.edu.cn 湘ICP备09001153号-4