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中南大学学报(社会科学版)
ZHONGNAN DAXUE XUEBAO(SHEHUI KEXUE BAN)

2014年06月第20卷第3期
   
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文章编号:1672-3104(2014)03-0028-05
 
媒体监督对公司治理中的投资者保护
 
任广乾
 
(郑州大学商学院,河南郑州,450001)
 
摘  要: 转型经济中正式制度的失灵或低效使得媒体监督作为一种法律外替代机制在公司治理中发挥着重要作用,媒体监督能够降低外部投资者的信息不对称程度,提升公司治理效率。结合媒体监督与公司治理的耦合机理,分析了媒体监督在公司治理中对投资者保护的作用,指出媒体的信息制造功能有利于缓解公司治理中的信息不对称,从而迫使公司高管改变行为,并通过声誉机制对投资者的决策行为发挥引导作用。从媒体公信力、公司公共关系努力以及共同社会价值取向等方面总结了影响媒体监督发挥非正式治理作用的因素。结合我国实际情况分析了媒体监督所遇到的困境,并给出了提高我国媒体监督在公司治理和投资者保护中发挥作用的建议。
 
关键词: 媒体监督;公司治理;耦合机理;投资者保护
 
 
The Investor Protection Effect of Media Monitoring in Corporate Governance
 
REN Guangqian
 
(Business School, Zhengzhou University, Zhengzhou 450001, China)
 
Abstract: The failure or inefficiency of formal systems in transition economies make media monitoring play an important role in corporate governance as alternative mechanism laws. Media monitoring can reduce the degree of information asymmetry of outside investors and enhance the efficiency of corporate governance. Combined with the coupling mechanism of media monitoring and corporate governance, this paper analyzes the media monitoring role for the protection of investors in corporate governance and points out that the information manufacturing capabilities of media will help alleviate asymmetric information in corporate governance, which will force company executives to change their behaviors and guide the decision-making behaviors of investors by reputation mechanism. Then this paper explores the impact factors of media monitoring from aspects of credibility of the media, corporate public relations efforts, and common social values. Finally, this paper analyzes the difficulties of media monitoring combined with China’s actual situation and makes policy recommendations.
 
Key words: Media monitoring; corporate governance; coupling mechanism; investor protection
 
 
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