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| 文章编号：1672-3104(2014)01-0161-05 |
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胡塞尔现象学对客体化行为中“意义”的建构 |
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张佳秋 |
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（同济大学人文学院，上海，200092；华东师范大学大学英语教学部，上海，200241） |
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| 摘 要： 胡塞尔现象学认为意识的本质在于构造对象的能力。意向本质包括质性和质料，质料即意义。构造对象和意义的几种客体化行为的立义方式之间既有联系又有区别：感知的立义包含有存在样式的设定，是偏重于“对象”的心理体验的意义相关项；在图像意识中，图像事物是感知立义，图像客体和图像主题则作为奠基于感知之上的想象通过代现被意指而获得意义；符号行为的意义则是独立于直观行为的客观的、观念性的意义，是观念的逻辑之物。 |
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| 关键词： 胡塞尔；现象学；意义；感知；图像意识；符号行为 |
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How Husserl’s phenomenology creates the “sense” in objectivations |
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ZHANG Jiaqiu |
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（Tongji University, College of Humanities, Shanghai 200092, China; Department of English Language Teaching,
East China Normal University, Shanghai 200241, China） |
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| Abstract: Husserl’s phenomenology believes that the essence of consciousness lies in its ability to create objects. The essence of intention includes quality and material, and material is sense. In the several objectivations that create objects and senses, and the forms of apprehension are related to and different from each other: The apprehension of perception includes the setting of the mode of existence, which is a psychological sense that emphasizes “object”; In image-consciousness, the physical image is perception, and the image object and the image subject are imagination based on perception and acquire senses; through representation the sense in signification is objective、ideal and independent of intuition, it is an ideal logical thing. |
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Key words: Husserl; phenomenology; sense; perception; image-consciousness; signification |
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