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中南大学学报(社会科学版)
ZHONGNAN DAXUE XUEBAO(SHEHUI KEXUE BAN)

2012年08月第18卷第4期
   
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文章编号:1672-3104(2012)04-0008-06
 
论地方政府融资平台与地方官员经济激励
 
王建丰,郭佳良
 
(北京大学政府管理学院,北京,100871)
 
摘  要: 对于地方政府融资平台大量涌现与地方债务危机快速膨胀现象,现有的大多数研究将其产生的现实动因归结为两个方面:一是1994年分税制改革后事权与财权不对称的公共财政体制;二是以GDP为中心的晋升锦标赛式的官员考核机制。然而,仅有这两方面因素的解释力是不够的,还应该考虑地方官员组建融资平台借债搞建设的经济激励因素。经济激励的效果包括扩充地方政府财政收入和官员个人通过腐败来谋取私利两个方面,而地方官员的经济激励已成为地方政府融资平台大量涌现与地方债务危机快速膨胀的重要现实动因。
 
关键词: 地方政府;融资平台;地方债务;晋升锦标赛;政治激励;经济激励
 
 
On the economic incentive of local officials and the financing platform of local governments
 
WANG Jianfeng, GUO Jialiang
 
(School of Government, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China)
 
Abstract: Concerning the emergence of the financing platform of local government in large numbers and the rapid expansion of local debt, most of the existing studies consider that two aspects of elements account for this phenomenon. One is the asymmetry of the public finance system after the 1994’s tax system reform; the other is the promotion tournament of local officials with regard to the assessment of local GDP. However, only these two aspects of factors are not enough. We should also consider the economic incentive of local officials as an important explaining variable in the formation of financing platform. Economic incentive includes the expansion of local government’s fiscal revenue as well as the local officials’ personal profit through corruption, and the economic incentive of local officials has become the important realistic motivation accounting for the emergence of the financing platform of local government in large numbers and the rapid expansion of local debt.
 
Key words: local government; financing platform; local debt; promotion tournament; political incentive; economic incentive
 
 
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