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| 文章编号：1672-3104(2011)01-0005-05 |
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心身问题与决定论、自由意志 |
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陈世锋 |
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（武汉大学政治与公共管理学院，湖北武汉，430072） |
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| 摘 要： 心身问题背后的根本症结是机械决定论与自由意志难以两全。一方面，西方近现代科学强调的机械决定论要求物理世界的因果封闭性，从而使自由意志无法作为一个真实的因素插入神经、肌肉等物理世界因果作用的链条之中，另一方面，道德、责任之可能又要求我们保留一种真实、而不仅是随附性的自由意志，这就构成了心身问题的两难处境。非决定论是自由意志的必要条件，但量子论等思想只是强调了主观认识论意义上的不可预测性，未能提供客观世界的、本体论意义上的非决定性。突现论中的下向因果则提供了一个突破决定论的可能，而自由意志也只能限定于认识及利用规律或必然。 |
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| 关键词： 哲学；心身问题；决定论；自由意志；下向因果 |
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Mind-body problem and determinism and free will |
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CHEN Shifeng |
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（School of Politics and Public Administration, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China） |
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| Abstract: The fundamental sticking point of mind-body problem is the conflict between mechanic determinism and free will. Moral and responsibility require the existence of an actual and not epiphenomenal free will. On the other hand, the modern science emphasizes the cause and effect closed in the physical world by the mechanism which denies that the free will can cause any physical movement being the true reason in the movement among muscles and neurons. Indeterminism is a necessary condition for free will, however quantum and other similar doctrines only emphasize the epistemological impossibility of forecast, failing to provide ontological indeterminism in any way. The downward causation emphasized by the doctrine of emergence provides some chances to challenge determinism, at the same time human free will must be limited only to make use of necessity. |
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Key words: philosophy; mind-body problem; determinism; free will; downward causation |
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