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中南大学学报(社会科学版)
ZHONGNAN DAXUE XUEBAO(SHEHUI KEXUE BAN)

2010年06月第16卷第4期
   
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文章编号:1672-3104(2010)04-0035-05
 
肯尼迪在美苏古巴导弹系统危机中的“战争边缘策略”
 
张红,刘会宝
 
(华东师范大学国际关系与地区发展研究院,上海,200062)
 
摘  要: 1962年的古巴导弹危机事件是冷战期间美苏之间最严重的一次直接对抗,肯尼迪采取了以武力威吓、制造风险、自我克制、准备谈判为特征的“边缘策略”。在危机发生的过程中,存在着一个追求谈判可能性边界的过程。核时代使得国际危机的处理方式发生变革,在核时代这个常量限定的条件下,博弈双方会控制边际收益,达成利益均衡点并缓和危机。
 
关键词: 肯尼迪;赫鲁晓夫;战争边缘策略;美苏古巴导弹危机;国际危机;边际成本原理
 
 
Kennedy’s “brink-of-war strategy” in Cuban missile crisis between the U.S. and Soviet Union in 1962
 
ZHANG Hong, LIU Huibao
 
(School of Advanced International and Area Studies, East China Normal University, Shanghai 200062, China)
 
Abstract: Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 was the most serious direct confrontation between the Soviet Union and the U.S.A. during the Cold War, when President Kennedy took “brink-of-war strategy” characterized by forces, risks, self-restraints and being ready to negotiate. During the crisis, there was a possibility to pursue the boundary of negotiations. The nuclear age leads ways to handle international crisis to revolution. Under the constant conditions of the nuclear age, both players of the game controlled their marginal benefits in order to reach the balance of interests and thus ease the crisis.
 
Key words: Kennedy; Khrushchev; brink-of-war strategy; Cuban Missile Crisisbetween the Soviet Union and the U.S.A.; international crisis; marginal cost principle
 
 
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