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| 文章编号：1672-3104(2003)01-0032-04 |
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权力腐败及其行政监察的博弈分析 |
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傅菊辉，彭中文，唐觅飞 |
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（湘潭大学马克思主义学院，湖南湘潭,411105） |
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| 摘 要： 腐败是社会的毒瘤，使资源的配置失去效率，严重影响社会发展。信息不完全和预期价值居高是导致腐败产生的主要原因,通过对混合策略的最优行为选择分析,认为作为理性人的权力人是否选择腐败取决于腐败行为与正常行为的比较效用大小。因此要搞好行政监察，政府要把公职人员掌握的稀有资源压缩到最低限度；同时要提高其正常的监管效用；要鼓励公民和各类机构反腐防腐，降低其腐败博弈时的预期价值等。 |
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| 关键词： 权力腐败; 行政监察; 博弈论; 纳什均衡 |
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On power corruption and its administrative supervision |
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FU Ju-hui,PENG Zhong-wen,TANG Mi-fei |
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（Marxism College, Xiangtan University, Xiangtan 411105, China） |
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| Abstract: The power corruption is a social cancer, which makes the allotment of social resources inefficient and affects the development of social economy seriously. Imperfect information and high expecting-value are the main causes of the corruption. The authors give an analysis of the mixed strategy and hold that whether the reasonable power decides on corruption depends on the comparative utility of the corruption behavior and normal behavior. Some administrative suggestions are brought up here. |
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Key words: power corruption; administrative supervision; game-theory; Nash-equilibrium |
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