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| 文章编号：1672-3104(2004)06-0690-04 |
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评密尔《论自由》关于国家干预的限度原则 |
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周云芳,谭忠诚 |
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（中南大学政治学与行政管理学院,湖南长沙,410083） |
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| 摘 要： 密尔在《论自由》一书中提出了一条基于利己和利他之分的国家干预的限度原则来作为划清个人自由与国家权力之间的界限,他的这一原则遭到了后来许多学者的质疑和批判。作者在此将尝试着对这些来自正反两方面立场进行辨析和论证,并揭示了密尔所确立的这条关于国家干预原则的局限性。 |
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| 关键词： 自由;个性自由;国家权威;利己主义;利他主义 |
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An analysis of the limited state s interference principle from Mill s Liberty |
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ZHOUYun-fang, TAN Zhong-cheng |
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（School of Politics and Administration Science, Central South University, Changsha 410083, China） |
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| Abstract: John StuartMill put forward the limited state s interference principle as a criterion to define the boundary between individual freedom and the state power. However, the principle, based on the division between egoism and altruism, received a great deal of criticism from scholars. The author aims at analyzing these arguments, either in favor of or against, it and revealing the limit ofMill s limited state s interference principle. |
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Key words: freedom;freedom of personality;the power of the state;egoism;altruism |
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