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| 文章编号：1672-3104(2004)03-0317-04 |
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审计监管与违规审计的博弈论分析 |
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阮梓坪 |
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（南京理工大学管理学院,江苏南京市,2100094） |
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| 摘 要： 按照博弈论的观点,可能有违规审计行为的会计师事务所与执行审计监管的政府部门是相互博弈的主体,在不考虑职业道德因素的情况下,它们之间存在着互相以对方的行为模式来决定自己行为模式的规律。文章通过建立违规审计的一般博弈模型和处罚模型,运用实际数据,探讨了违规审计与审计监管的内在规律,认为要有效抑制违规审计行为,必须将监管面扩大到审计收费金额的1/3,处罚力度应加大到没收非法所得并处以3倍左右的罚款。 |
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| 关键词： 违规审计;审计监管;博弈;纳什均衡 |
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Game theory analysis on regulation breaching audit and audit supervision |
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RUAN Zi-ping |
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（Nanjing University of Science&Technology, Nanjing 2100094, China） |
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| Abstract: Based on the pointofgame theory, CPAfirmand audit supervising authoritymay be a relative game body. Not considering the professional morality, it contains a regular patternwhich both sideswould take their action on it. By setting up an ordinarygame model and anothermodel for punishment, applying practical data, this article explores the internal regular pattern between regulation breaching audit and audit supervision and argues that a 1/3 audit fee should be covered by supervising; fraudulent gains should be confiscated; a fine should be three times of the said gains so as to bring the regulation breaching audit behavior under control. |
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Key words: regulation breaching audit; audit supervision; game theory; nash equilibrium |
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