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| 文章编号：1672-3104(2026)01-0218-13 |
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央地财政分权何以影响区域协调发展？——一个政治经济学分析 |
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肖芸 |
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（中山大学马克思主义学院，广东广州，510275） |
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| 摘 要： 央地财政分权如何影响区域协调发展是政治经济学研究中相对被忽略的议题。改革开放以来的经验表明，中国式分权虽是经济实现高速增长的一项重要制度安排，却与区域协调发展目标之间存在着明显的张力。分析发现，张力来自地方、国家两个向度，在中国式分权的强激励与弱约束机制的作用下形成。特定的激励与约束机制通过塑造地方政府的自主性、国家的自主性及二者之间的竞争性互动关系，引发地方政府的冲突式发展行为及区域发展中国家角色的失灵，进而对区域协调发展产生制约影响。在新时代，中央做出了泛化激励、强化约束的制度回应，使央地财政分权在制度安排上呈现出“更加倚重约束”的新特征。这将促使地方政府凝聚协调发展共识，并推动国家找回在地方发展中的主导地位。 |
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| 关键词： 央地财政分权；激励与约束；国家自主性；地方政府自主性 |
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How fiscal decentrailisation affects coordinated development: A political-economic analysis |
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XIAO Yun |
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（School of Marxism, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou 510275, China） |
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| Abstract: How fiscal decentralisation affects coordinated regional development is a relatively neglected topic in the field of political-economic research. Experience since the reform and opening up shows that, although the Chinese-style decentralisation is an important institutional arrangement for achieving high economic growth, there is a clear tension between it and the goal of coordinated regional development. The analysis finds that the tension originates from the local-national direction and is formed by the strong incentives and weak constraints of Chinese-style decentralisation. By shaping local autonomy, national autonomy and the competitive interactions between them, specific incentive and constraint mechanisms trigger conflicting development behaviours of local governments and dysfunctions of the state's role in regional development. In response to these challenges, the central government has adopted a strategy of generalising incentives and strengthening constraints. This approach entails the institutional arrangements characterised by a new feature of “greater reliance on constraints”, which may encourage local governments to build consensus on coordinated development and bring the state back in local development. |
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Key words: fiscal decentralisation; incentive and constraint; state autonomy; local autonomy |
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