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| 文章编号：1672-3104(2026)01-0098-17 |
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地方官员定量环境考核与企业环境绩效——来自《生态文明建设目标评价考核办法》的证据 |
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潘红波，张书敏，杨轩 |
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（武汉大学经济与管理学院，湖北武汉，430072） |
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| 摘 要： 地方官员是生态文明建设最重要的利益相关者，对其进行环境考核对我国实现双碳目标具有重要的现实意义。借助《生态文明建设目标评价考核办法》的准自然实验，分析地方官员强制性定量环境考核对企业环境治理的影响及作用机制。研究发现：《生态文明建设目标评价考核办法》实施后，相较于民营非重污染企业，地方国有重污染企业的环境绩效显著提升，且上述效应在环保政策执行力度较强、非省份边界地区及控制链长度较短的企业中更为突出。机制检验发现，地方官员通过提升高管薪酬—环境绩效敏感性、加强政府环保补助和推出银行贷款的“胡萝卜”政策，以及提升高管强制变更—环境绩效敏感性、收取排污费的“大棒”政策，联合发挥着对地方国有重污染企业的环境治理作用。在供应链溢出方面，地方官员强制性定量环境考核实施后，地方国有重污染企业促进了本地民营重污染供应商的环境治理，但对外地民企供应商环境表现的提升效果不明显；在区域层面，地方国有重污染企业经济占比越高，当地环境改善程度越大。 |
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| 关键词： 地方官员；定量环境考核；环境绩效；高管薪酬—环境绩效敏感性；高管强制变更—环境绩效敏感性 |
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Quantitative environmental assessment by local officials and corporate environmental performance—Evidences from Evaluation and Assessment Methods for Ecological Civilization Construction Goals |
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PAN Hongbo, ZHANG Shumin, YANG Xuan |
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（Economics and Management School of Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China） |
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| Abstract: Local officials are the most important stakeholders in the construction of ecological civilisation, and how to assess the environmental performance of the local officials is of great practical significance for China to achieve the strategic goal of “carbon peak and carbon neutral”. By adopting quasi-natural experiments in the Evaluation and Assessment Methods for Ecological Civilization Construction Goals (Methods), this study analyzes the impact and mechanism of mandatory quantitative environmental assessments by local officials on corporate environmental governance. Researches find that after the implementation of Methods, the environmental performance of local state-owned heavy polluting enterprises is significantly improved compared to private non-heavy polluting enterprises, and that the above effect is more prominent in enterprises with stronger environmental policy enforcement, non-provincial border areas, and shorter control chain lengths. Mechanism tests find that local officials play a joint role in environmental governance of state-owned heavy polluters by enhancing executive compensation plus environmental performance sensitivity, strengthening government environmental subsidies as well as bank loans，reinforcing executive mandatory change plus environmental performance sensitivity, and charging sewage fee penalties. In terms of supply chain spillover effects, after the implementation of mandatory quantitative environmental assessments by local officials, local state-owned heavy polluting enterprises have significantly promoted the environmental governance of local private heavy polluting suppliers, but the effect of improving the environmental performance of foreign private suppliers was not obvious. At the level of overall regional environmental governance, the higher the share of local state-owned heavy polluting economies, the greater the degree of local environmental improvement. The study explains how the mandatory quantitative environmental assessment by local officials pushes enterprises to carry out environmental governance, and provides useful insights for the green development of China’s real economy under the strategic deployment of ecological civilisation construction. |
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Key words: local officials; quantitative environmental assessment; environmental performance; executive compensation plus environmental performance sensitivity; mandatory executive change plus environmental performance sensitivity |
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