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| 文章编号：1672-3104(2025)05-0111-15 |
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政府绩效第三方评估中主体意向的分化及其协调——基于Q方法的分析 |
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包国宪，戴正 |
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（兰州大学管理学院，甘肃兰州，730000） |
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| 摘 要： 运用Q方法探究中国第三方政府绩效评估中主体意向的分化现象及其协调路径，发现政府部门存在管理效能型、资源争取型和问责督导型三种意向类型，第三方机构表现出专业价值型、市场生存型和公共责任型三种取向。这种意向分化根植于制度二元性、利益格局失衡和评估情境多元化等深层机制，导致了“功能异化”现象，表现为评估目标偏离、过程形式化和结果应用选择性等问题，对评估的科学性和有效性构成了挑战。进而提出系统性的协调策略：在宏观层面重构评估的制度逻辑框架，将评估从“政府管理的外包服务”转向“公共治理的专业支撑”；在中观层面构建多元制衡的治理架构，破解委托代理关系中的权力失衡问题；在微观层面完善专业技术标准体系，压缩意向分化的操作空间。 |
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| 关键词： 委托第三方评估；Q方法；意向分化；绩效评估 |
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Consensus and divergence of subject intentions in the third-party evaluation of government performance: Analysis based on Q methodology |
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BAO Guoxian, DAI Zheng |
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（School of Management, Lanzhou University, Lanzhou 730000, China） |
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| Abstract: This study, by employing Q methodology to investigate the phenomenon of stakeholder intention divergence and coordination pathways of the subject intention in China’s third-party government performance evaluation system. The research identifies such three distinct intention types among government departments as management-efficiency-oriented, resource-acquisition-oriented, and accountability- supervision-oriented, while third-party institutions demonstrate profession-value-oriented, market-survival- oriented, and public--responsibility-oriented orientations. This intention divergence is rooted in deep-seated mechanisms including institutional dualism, asymmetric interest configurations, and pluralistic evaluation contexts, resulting in “functional alienation” characterized by goal displacement, procedural formalization, and selective utilization of evaluation outcomes, posing challenges to the scientific rigor and effectiveness of performance evaluation. The study further proposes the following systematic coordination strategies: at the macro level, reconstructing the institutional logic framework by reorienting evaluation from “outsourced government services” to “professional governance support”; at the meso level, establishing multi-stakeholder checks-and-balances governance architecture to address power imbalances inherent in principal-agent relationships; and at the micro level, enhancing professional technical standards systems to constrain the operational space for intention divergence. |
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Key words: commissioned third-party evaluation; Q methodology; intention divergence; performance evaluation |
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