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| 文章编号：1672-3104(2014)01-0015-08 |
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管理者过度自信、公司治理与企业过度投资 |
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章细贞，张欣 |
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（中南大学商学院，湖南长沙，410083） |
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| 摘 要： 以2007—2010年沪深两市上市公司为研究对象，研究管理者过度自信对企业过度投资行为的影响，以及公司治理对它的抑制作用。实证检验的结果表明：管理者过度自信与企业过度投资存在显著的正相关关系；良好的公司治理能够抑制管理者过度自信导致的企业过度投资。具体来说，公司治理因素中的董事会的独立性、董事长与总经理两职分离、债权人和政府的干预能对管理者过度自信导致的过度投资行为起到抑制作用，但行业竞争强度的抑制作用不明显。 |
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| 关键词： 管理者过度自信；控制幻觉；公司治理；企业过度投资；委托代理；认知纠偏效应 |
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Managerial Overconfidence, Corporate Governance and Firms’ Overinvestment |
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ZHANG Xizhen, ZHANG Xin |
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（School of Business, Central South University, Changsha 410083, China） |
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| Abstract: From the perspective of behavioral finance, the authors examine the influence of managerial overconfidence on firms’ overinvestment using the data of China A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2010, and test the restriction effect of governance mechanisms. The evidence shows that managerial overconfidence is obviously positively correlated with overinvestment, and effective corporate governance mitigates managerial overconfidence and hence reduces the level of overinvestment of listed companies. Specifically, independent board, splitting of CEO and Chairman, and creditor and the government’s interference can play the restraining role, while the industry competition can’t. |
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Key words: managerial overconfidence; illusion of control; corporate governance; overinvestment of enterprises; agence by agreement; cognitive error-correcting effect |
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